Longitudinal Analysis of Android Ad Library Permissions by Book, Theodore et al.
Longitudinal Analysis of Android Ad Library
Permissions
Theodore Book, Adam Pridgen, Dan S. Wallach
Rice University
{tbook, dso, dwallach}@rice.edu
Abstract—This paper investigates changes over time in the
behavior of Android ad libraries. Taking a sample of 114,000
apps, we extract and classify their ad libraries. By considering
the release dates of the applications that use a specific ad library
version, we estimate the release date for the library, and thus
build a chronological map of the permissions used by various
ad libraries over time. By considering install counts, we are
able to estimate the number of times that a given library has
been installed on users’ devices. We find that the use of most
permissions has increased over the last several years, and that
more libraries are able to use permissions that pose particular
risks to user privacy and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Android operating system is one of the primary mobile
device platforms worldwide, accounting for 70% of smart-
phone shipments, according to industry sources [1]. It also
supports a vibrant advertising industry, with dozens of adver-
tising agencies providing ad libraries installed in hundreds of
thousands of free applications. The diversity of these libraries
and the availability of the applications for research makes
Android an ideal platform to study the impact of advertising
libraries on mobile device security.
Similar to the web domain, the dominant monetization
model for applications on the Android platform consists of
free applications where the developers receive compensation
through the sale of ads [2]. The advertising model on which
this is built is based on Java libraries supplied by advertis-
ing agencies which are bundled into application packages.
These libraries communicate with servers controlled by the
advertising agency, sending request information, receiving and
displaying an advertisement, and handling user interaction
with the ad, including redirects to content and accounting
functions. These libraries execute as a binary portion of the
host application.
Thus, there are three principal interfaces for an ad li-
brary: with the rest of the application, with Internet resources
(principally the ad provider’s servers), and with the Android
operating system. It is with the third of these interfaces that
this paper will be concerned.
The Android Permission System: The Android operating
system limits application privileges through a permission sys-
tem. Privileges are requested by the application developer in
a manifest which is incorporated into the application package,
and approved by the user when the application is installed.
The user may only choose to accept all of the permissions
or not install the app — they can not grant or deny specific
permissions. The Android API reference lists 130 permissions,
which regulate the ability of an app to make various system
API calls. The functions covered by a permission range from
the clear to the obtuse — for example, the read phone state
permission also gives access to a commonly used device
identifier.
Because the granularity of these permissions is at the level
of the application, an advertising library necessarily shares in
all of the privileges of its hosting application. As an ad library
is able to probe for the presence of a particular permission, it
is potentially able to make use of permissions in its host app
on an opportunistic basis [3]. Of course, an ad library can also
require the presence of certain permissions to function.
Concerns have been raised about the interest and ability of
users to make sound security judgments on the appropriateness
of an app’s behavior based on the permission system [4].
Indeed, the permission system has not prevented significant
negative publicity related to Android apps making inappro-
priate use of personal data, even when the user approved the
permissions requested in the manifest [5].
Research Goals: A number of studies have documented that
Android ad libraries are able to use application permissions to
gain access to sensitive user data [6]. However, these studies
have focused on the state of the Android ad ecosystem at a
single point in time. This paper seeks to extend that work
by looking at change over time in library permission usage.
By doing so, developments in the ad ecosystem driven by
technical progress, privacy concerns, and financial incentives
become more explicit.
II. METHODOLOGY
In order to conduct this analysis, we needed to obtain an
appropriate sample. A collection of 114,000 applications were
downloaded from Google Play — the primary Android appli-
cation store. All were free applications, which are, presumably,
the type most likely to contain advertisements. We selected the
most popular apps from a database of 375,000 applications
extracted from Google Play, which contained information on
the number of installs and release date for each app. This
database reflects roughly half of the over 675,000 apps that
Google reports on the Google Play overview page [7]. We
assessed popularity by selecting applications on the basis of
number of installs, with preference given to higher numbers
of installs. This enabled the sample to reflect the installed app
base more accurately. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
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Fig. 1. Distribution of Sample by Number of Installs
sample according to the lower bounds on the total number of
installs for each app, as provided by Google Play.
After collecting the applications, we disassembled them
using Gabor Paller’s Dedexer. We manually identified pack-
age names for 68 different ad libraries by parsing through
the collection of disassembled apps.1 We then automatically
identified all ad libraries matching our known package names
within the entire sample. It should be noted that this method
necessarily produces an incomplete collection of ad libraries.
It omits any libraries for which we did not have a package
name, and those libraries (such as AirPush) that obfuscate
their package names for some versions. We extracted 108,000
ad library instances, an average of approximately one library
per app, although some apps contained many libraries, and
others contained none. We then hashed each library to generate
a unique identifier corresponding to the library version. See
below for some complications. In this way, we were able to
identify the library name and separate the libraries by version
without needing any special knowledge of each library’s
internal structure. We then grouped all libraries with the same
version hash.
Dating: Once we had identified library names and versions,
it became possible to date them. Because we knew the release
date for each of the apps, it was safe to assume that the library
version was released before the first app which used it. Thus
we were able to establish a terminus ad quem or latest possible
release date for each library version by assigning it a date equal
to the release date of the earliest app that made use of that
library.
In order to verify the accuracy of this approach, we extracted
library version codes from the Google AdMob libraries we
identified. This enabled us to compare the calculated release
dates with the actual release dates as reported by Google [8].
On average, our calculated date was 18 days before the official
release, while several major versions were dated within one
day of the official release. We also identified several AdMob
versions not listed by Google in its release history. The
1Included in the libraries were several ad mediation and analytics libraries
earlier dates could be a result of beta/testing releases of the
APKs, or of inaccuracy in the app release dating provided
by Google. For libraries included in fewer applications, our
dating approach will necessarily be less precise. However,
the demonstrated accuracy of the AdMob dating suggests
that our methodology has value in practice, enabling us to
survey effectively a large number of libraries without having
to reverse engineer them.
Measuring Permisson Usage: We measured permission us-
age by analyzing the disassembled libraries. A list of system
calls requiring permissions was obtained from the API call
mappings produced by the PScout tool developed by Au,
et al. [9]. Our method of generating permission mappings
is similar to that used by Felt, et al. [10] in their work
on Android permissions, however, we considered permission
usage only within the ad library code, and not within the entire
application. Because we only consider static API calls, our
analysis is conservative, and would miss API calls invoked via
reflection, direct generation of Dalvik bytecode, dynamically
downloaded bytecode, etc. Using this method, however, we
were able to identify a large number of system calls and the
permissions required to make those calls.
Because we were interested in the libraries, themselves, we
did not conduct control-flow analysis to identify whether these
library API calls were, in fact, invoked in any particular app.
Nor did we correlate the permissions necessary to use the
calls with the permissions present in the manifest for any
particular app. Rather, by showing the presence of API calls
requiring a certain permission, we showed that the library
was capable (under some set of circumstances) of making use
of that permission. Therefore, for API calls that require one
permission out of a set of multiple permissions to function, we
included all of the permissions in the set as permissions that
the library was capable of using. While the permissions used
by some API calls, such as some of the location calls, vary
depending on the input given to the call, most API calls require
a fixed set of permissions that do not change depending on
their input. In cases where the input to the API call influences
which permissions are checked, we include all permissions that
might be used, admittedly a maximal set. While it would be
interesting to see which applications actually contain control
flow paths that reach these API calls, we chose to focus on
the structure of the libraries, rather then the way they were
employed in individual applications.
Identifying Unique Ad Library Releases: We encountered
some difficulties in identifying ad library releases by hashing
the decompiled code. Due to the way that an Android APK
is assembled, virtual register numbers within each library
instance varied, based on the other components of the app.
We compensated for this by ignoring the actual names of the
virtual registers and only considering the presence of a field.
Beyond this, however, additional challenges presented them-
selves. Because the process of assembling an Android appli-
cation, especially when obfuscating and optimizing software
such as ProGuard is used, may omit or rename portions of the
library, a single library version may vary in size and content
after being included in an app. This means that a single library
release may produce multiple installed versions, each with
different capabilities and signatures. Rather than attempting to
correlate which version hashes derived from the same library
release, we allowed different hashes to stand independently.
While this made it impossible for us to count accurately the
total number of releases of a particular ad library, it allowed us
to measure permission use and date library releases as desired.
Some negative impacts from this methodology should be
noted. Some of the code of the original ad library release
may not be included in a given app, including API calls. This
means that it is possible for our methodology to under-measure
permission usage of a given ad library version release. Addi-
tionally, because a library release that becomes fragmented
into multiple versions will have fewer apps recorded for each
version, the dating becomes less accurate. However, to the
extent that our dating is correct, all of the different hashes
produced by a single release should be dated to approximately
the same period. Because our analysis takes the union of all
permissions used by library versions dated to a given month,
the permissions available to the most complete version of the
library are the ones actually measured.
III. ANALYSIS
Having identified library names and versions, dated them,
and mapped their permission usage, it then became possible
to map the change in permission usage by various ad libraries
over time. We derived the following results from the data.
A. Permission Usage by Library
In order to develop a preliminary understanding of the
data, it was useful to consider the number of permissions
used by each library. While for many libraries, the number
of permissions changed over time, the maximum number of
permissions (or sets of equivalent permissions) that we found
any library able to use was 15, exploitable by some versions
of MobClix.2 The average library was able to make use of
3.3 permissions. The minimum number of permissions that a
library could exploit was one, with the INTERNET permission
being required by all libraries. While some libraries are much
more popular than others, previous researchers have generally
not calculated the number of installs for each library. We
include this per-library data to enable better comparison of
our results with theirs.
B. Permission Usage over Time
More interesting than the static data is the changing number
of permissions that a single library can utilize. By simply
examining the number of libraries able to use a single per-
mission, we are able to see which permissions are accessible
2Those permissions included INTERNET, ACCESS NETWORK STATE, WAKE
LOCK, GET TASKS, ACCESS FINE LOCATION, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,
CAMERA, READ PHONE STATE, VIBRATE, WRITE SOCIAL STREAM, WRITE
CONTACTS, READ SOCIAL STREAM, READ CONTACTS, READ SYNC SET-
TINGS, and GET ACCOUNTS. Note that multiple sets of permissions can give
access to a single API call; for example, the various SOCIAL STREAM and
CONTACTS permissions each allow a library to read a user’s contacts.
Fig. 2. Number of Libraries Able to Use Permission
by the greatest number of libraries. Figure 2 shows the
number of libraries capable of using the seven most common
permissions.3 A number of less common, but potentially
dangerous permissions are grouped together under the heading
of “Dangerous”. A library that used one or more of these
permissions was categorized as using dangerous permissions.
We categorize permissions as potentially dangerous when
they provide access to personal user information, make it
possible to directly monitor the user’s activity, allow the library
to make operations that cost money, or provide access to the
system state. For more information, see section III-E.
It is important to note that the ability of an ad library
to utilize these permissions does not necessarily mean that
they were being abused. With appropriate user confirmation,
many of them could have legitimate uses. However, as these
permissions also enable various sorts of abuse, they are worthy
of special scrutiny.
While Figure 2 gives a count of the number of libraries
using a particular permission, it may be more useful to present
this data on a percentage basis. Figure 3 represents the percent
of known libraries using a given permission for the months
where we had data on five or more libraries. The data becomes
more precise for later months where we were able to measure
additional ad libraries. As can be seen, most permissions,
including the dangerous permissions, show an increasing trend,
a potential cause for concern.
Although we did not conduct a comprehensive analysis
of all API calls requiring permissions, some notes may be
made on the most popular permissions. The universal use
of the INTERNET permission corresponds to the ad library’s
most basic function — downloading and displaying advertise-
ments. The ACCESS NETWORK STATE permission is used by
a number of libraries to call android.net.ConnectivityManager.
3In the cases where multiple versions of a library dated to a single month,
we took the union of all the permissions called for by any version of the
library.
Fig. 3. Percent of Libraries Able to Use Permission
getActiveNetworkInfo, presumably in order to determine the
connection over which they are requesting data. The READ
PHONE STATE permission is necessary for retrieving a device
ID from the telephony manager. Likewise, ACCESS WIFI STATE
may be used to obtain the MAC address of the device to help
identify it (and its user) uniquely. WAKE LOCK is used by some
video playback API calls. VIBRATE is self-explanatory. While
ACCESS FINE LOCATION is also self-explanatory, it is worth
noting that all library calls surveyed that made use of system
calls for location data used calls that could use either ACCESS
FINE LOCATION or ACCESS COURSE LOCATION, depending
on which permission was available.
C. Library Market Share
Of course, data that only tracks the number of libraries using
a certain permission is somewhat artificial, as some libraries
are much more popular than others. In order to understand
better the permissions accessible by the ad libraries that might
be present on a randomly chosen device, we corrected the data
based on the popularity of a given ad library.
Library popularity can be measured in two different ways —
by the number of apps using a library, and by the cumulative
number of installs for a given library across all apps that
include it. Figure 4 shows the number of apps within our
dataset where each library was detected, and an estimate of
the number of installs for each library. The top 10 libraries
represent 71% of all measured installs.
Google reports app install data based on ranges with a
factor of two or five between the top and the bottom of the
range. (e.g., 1,000–5,000 installs or 5,000–10,000 installs.)
For our analysis, we chose the low end of the range as a
conservative estimate of the number of installs for a given
app. Because we do not have more precise install counts, the
Fig. 4. Top 10 Libraries by Installs. The number of apps containing a given
library is presented on the primary Y axis, and the number of installs for a
given library on the secondary Y axis.
actual numbers may be greater by as much as a factor of five.
Additionally, because the install count only considers apps
within our dataset, when other apps are included, the numbers
undoubtedly become larger. Nevertheless, these counts give
us an effective means to compare the relative popularity of
different libraries.
Because our set of apps focused on those apps with higher
numbers of installs, this data should accurately reflect the
popularity of ad libraries among the most popular apps. It
is possible that a different distribution is found among less
popular apps. However, as the more popular apps are, by
definition, more likely to be found on any given device, we
believe that this distribution is reflective of the distribution of
ad libraries likely to be found on a user’s device.
It is worth noting that while a few libraries (particularly
Google’s AdMob) have a clearly dominant position in the mar-
ketplace, there are a large number of libraries with significant
market share. The top 25 libraries have approximately 90%
market share, while the top 33 have 95% market share. It is,
of course, likely that we failed to identify some ad libraries,
although we assume that we were able to correctly identify
the most popular ones.
Given the fact that there are dozens of different ad libraries
with significant market share (nearly all of the libraries we
surveyed had tens if not hundreds of millions of installs), it
becomes clear that the security of a user’s data and device
depends on the behavior of a large number of principals. While
we did not attempt to estimate the number of libraries likely
to be found on a typical device, this data shows that there is
certainly a possibility for many libraries to be present, each
of which presents security concerns.
D. Install Weighted Permission Usage
Using library popularity data to weight the various libraries,
it then becomes possible to see the permissions that might be
accessible to a “typical” ad library install. Because the gran-
ularity of the data made it difficult to reconstruct the historic
market share of different ad libraries, we made the assumption
that library market share remained constant over the period
studied. The results of this analysis is shown in Figure 5.4 We
observe that the general trends are similar to the trends seen
when we considered individual libraries, but the absolute val-
ues for some permissions are different. In particular, ACCESS
WIFI STATE is used in a lower percentage of installs, as is VI-
BRATE. ACCESS FINE LOCATION, however, is more common,
mainly due to the use of android.location.LocationManager.
getLastKnownLocation in some versions of AdMob. The re-
moval of that API call accounts for the significant drop in that
permission in the middle of 2012. It can be seen that the use of
dangerous permissions is somewhat less common, as they are
not used by the largest ad libraries. Likewise, the permissions
used to generate unique tracking IDs (READ PHONE STATE
and ACCESS WIFI STATE) are somewhat less common.5 The
VIBRATE permission is much less commonly used.
E. Dangerous Permissions
The subset of permissions which we labeled “Dangerous
Permissions” comprises a relatively small set of the permis-
sions used by Android ad libraries, but is still of particular
interest. Figure 6 shows the install weighted prevalence of
the various dangerous permissions among the libraries studied.
Although the data is noisy due to the relatively small number
of libraries using these permissions, a generally increasing
trend can be seen. A brief review of these permissions gives
some indication of their use. GET TASKS refers to processes,
not a user to-do list, and seems often to be used for API calls
such as android.app.ActivityManager.getRunningTasks and an-
droid.app.ActivityManager.getRecentTasks. These may be used
in conjunction with PackageManager, which will return the
list of installed apps without requiring any permissions, in
order to determine which apps are installed on the device,
and which are regularly used. This data represents a potential
privacy breach, and could represent a security weakness if the
apps are scanned to identify apps that have potential security
weaknesses.
The SOCIAL STREAM, CONTACTS, and SYNC SET-
TINGS permissions are used by calls such as an-
droid.provider.ContactsContract.Contacts.getLookupUri to ob-
tain information about the user’s contacts. The GET AC-
COUNTS permission allows the library to identify if a
4The downward spike in the ACCESS FINE LOCATION permission in March
of 2012 is due to version 5.0.0 of AdMob. We did not detect any location
code in the few samples of that version that we collected, although we did
find it in version 6.01, which was dated slightly later.
5Android supplies an install specific ID that can be accessed without any
permissions (Settings.Secure.ANDROID ID). However, this ID may change
upon factory reset, or on a rooted phone. Occasional implementation bugs
may result in it being missing, or the same across multiple devices. These
shortcomings may encourage library designers to seek other IDs.
Fig. 5. Percent of Library Installs Able to Use Permission
Fig. 6. Dangerous Permissions: Percent of Library Installs Able to Use
Permission
user has an account on their device with a provider such
as Google or Facebook through an API call such as
android.accounts.AccountManager.getAccountsByType. While
full credentials for a user’s accounts are not returned, the ac-
count name is. For example, on Google accounts, the account
name is the user’s email address, allowing the ad agency to
potentially send e-mail to the user, while providing another
unique identifier. CHANGE WIFI STATE is used by some ad
libraries to scan for WiFi access points, which has potential
value in determining the user’s location. The use of the
CAMERA permission allows the library to control the camera
directly, without the need to send an intent to the camera
application. Some libraries advertise the ability for the user to
interact with the ad by taking pictures and uploading them to
the ad server. The RECORD AUDIO permission is likewise used
by some ad providers to record audio. Likewise, the READ
HISTORY BOOKMARKS is used to read the web browser book-
marks through the android.provider.Browser.getAllBookmarks
interface. The privacy issues involved in this are obvious.6
F. Comparison With Other Datasets
In order to further assess the accuracy of our results, we
compared them with a library of 5,000 Android apps retrieved
from the Android Market (now Google Play) in May of 2011,
as part of the AdSplit project [11]. When analyzed through the
same process, these apps yielded 3,374 ad libraries, a slightly
smaller ratio than the principal dataset. When the permissions
used by those libraries were analyzed, they were substantially
the same as the inferred values for May of 2011. The greatest
variation was in the VIBRATE permission, which showed up
in 15% of libraries in the 2011 sample, while the 2013 data
implied a 7% rate. Of course, the 2011 sample undoubtedly
contains many apps older than the sample date. Unfortunately,
however, metadata to track the app release dates was not
collected with the AdSplit sample, so we can not attempt to
reconstruct the release dates for the ad libraries found therein.
G. Overall Trends
Whether considered on a per-library or per-install basis, it
is clear that the number of permissions which the average ad
library is capable of using has been steadily increasing over
the two and a half year period for which we had reasonable
data. Particular growth is seen in the READ PHONE STATE
and ACCESS NETWORK STATE permissions, although almost
all permissions show an upward trend. Presumably, this is
because ad library developers find that their libraries are more
effective when they make use of these additional permissions.
Unfortunately for users, however, most of the permission
creep seems directed not at making the ad libraries work
more smoothly and efficiently (with the possible exception of
the ACCESS NETWORK STATE permission), but at extracting
additional data about the user. Permission growth occurs
largely in the permissions needed to uniquely identify the
device (and, by extension, the user), such as READ PHONE
STATE and ACCESS WIFI STATE, and in permissions that make
ads more obtrusive, such as VIBRATE. It is possible that some
of the permission growth relates to an increasing ability of
ad libraries to incorporate rich media such as video — in
particular, the WAKE LOCK permission seems to be related to
6In addition to the permissions included in the graph, several other,
extremely rare, permissions were included in the set of dangerous permissions.
They are: KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES, SEND SMS, WRITE HISTORY
BOOKMARKS, WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE, MANAGE ACCOUNTS, WRITE
SYNC SETTINGS, AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS, RESTART PACKAGES, BLUE-
TOOTH, BLUETOOTH ADMIN, BROADCAST STICKY, and MODIFY AUDIO
SETTINGS.
video API calls. However, most seems to be simply related to
the collection of additional data on the user.
Within the area of permission growth the permissions identi-
fied as dangerous represent a significant area of concern. While
the libraries that make use of these permissions comprise a
small portion of the total sample, a growing number of libraries
do make use of them. The same dynamics seem to be at work
as with the more common permissions — a desire for a more
intrusive ad experience coupled with a desire to obtain more
information regarding the user. MobClix, one of the largest
users of permissions, seeks to attract advertisers by advertising
the ability to access contacts, the user’s media library, GPS,
calendar, camera, e-mail, and SMS [12].
The principal exception to increasing permission use is
a steady decline in the number of libraries making use of
the ACCESS FINE LOCATION and ACCESS COURSE LOCATION
permissions. Google has played a significant role by removing
location code from its AdMob library (although app developers
can still choose to pass location information manually) but
this change has also been reflected in a large number of
other libraries. It may be that ad providers are able to obtain
sufficiently detailed location information from the phone’s IP
address, or that the commercial value of location information
is less than was once expected, but it is also possible that
users’ privacy concerns have created an environment where
app developers prefer to use ad libraries that do not include
location code. Overall, however, ad library permission usage
remains on an increasing trend.
IV. RELATED WORK
A number of authors have analyzed Android applications to
assess security vulnerabilities. For example, Enck et al. [13]
conduct a broad study of security vulnerabilities in 1,100
disassembled apps. Gibler et al. [14] use static analysis to
identify potential leaks of personal information in Android
applications.
A significant amount of research has been conducted into
Android ad libraries. Stevens, et al. [3] analyze 13 ad libraries,
comparing their permission usage with their documented per-
mission requirements, and show privacy weaknesses related
to user tracking as well as system APIs exposed to Javascript
exploits. Grace, et al. [6] conduct a similar analysis on 100 ad
libraries selected from 100,000 apps. They likewise identify
permission usage and other security risks, such as the potential
to load and execute arbitrary bytecode through the ad interface.
Neither of these papers, however, consider the development of
ad libraries over time, or even make reference to variations
among different versions of the same library.
Additional research has targeted other aspects of the An-
droid ad ecosystem. The data traffic [15] and energy [16] usage
involved in displaying ads has been examined. Leontiadis,
et al. [2] look at the other side of the issue, considering
the importance of advertising, including access to personal
information, in maintaining the Android app ecosystem, while
examining various ways of regulating and monitoring an An-
droid application’s access to personal data. Vallina Rodriguez
et al. [17] study mobile ads through an analysis of network
traffic on a major European mobile carrier, considering energy
implications and ways of optimizing the ad delivery system.
Significant work has also been done on resolving the
security issues involved in the current Android ad model.
One of the most prominent approaches has been to advocate
separating ads from applications, enabling isolation of permis-
sions and data [11] [18]. In particular, the AdSplit framework
considers the value of providing advertisers with protection
against fraudulent behavior on the part of app developers,
while at the same time separating apps and ad libraries,
allowing each to function with separate permissions.
V. APP STORE POLICING
After we collected our original data, Google conducted a
purge of some 60,000 apps from Google Play [?]. We were
interested in seeing how the apps in our sample fared, and
so we re-surveyed the apps to see which had been removed.
While many of the apps re-appeared on Google Play within
a matter of days (presumably with changes made to address
Google’s concerns), we were able to identify 9,980 apps from
our sample (almost 10%) that were no longer available. While
some of the apps may have been removed by their publisher,
it seems likely that many were removed by Google.
After identifying the missing applications, we went back
to our original data set to see what ad libraries were used in
those apps. We found that apps containing certain libraries
were much more likely to be removed than others. Some
of the libraries whose apps were disproportionately removed
are included in Figure 7. The column “Missing” indicates
the number of apps containing a library that were removed.
“Original” gives the number of apps in the original sample that
contained the library. The next column gives the percentage
of the total number of apps that were removed. “Permissions”
gives the total number of permissions that we identified as
being usable by the library.
While we made this discovery too close to publication time
for more in–depth analysis, further research could determine
if the restored versions of these apps lacked these libraries,
suggesting that removal of these apps is related to the behavior
of their ad libraries. While we have no inside knowledge of
what caused Google to select some of these apps for being
removed, it’s possible that poorly-behaved advertising libraries
might be complicit in their host applications’ deletion. By
looking at the “permissions” column (fig. 7), we can see
that these advertising libraries seem to use an unusually high
number of permissions. However, the fact that some instances
of apps using these libraries were deleted while others remain
suggests that Google isn’t simply banning specific advertising
libraries.
Many of the libraries included in Figure 7 exhibited
additional negative behavior: EverBadge and AirPush place
launch icons on the user’s home screen; AirPush, MobPartner,
and SendDroid all publicize the ability to send advertisements
to users in the form of push notifications. Ongoing analysis
Missing Original Removed Permissions
EverBadge 81 134 60.5% 2
Hunt Mobile 161 354 45.5% 3
AirPush † 801 1966 40.7% 9
SendDroid 417 1,335 31.2% 8
Waps 57 192 29.7% 8
Tapit 130 458 28.4% 7
AdsMogo 19 67 28.4% 8
Adfonic 186 767 24.3% 5
RevMob 166 706 23.5% 6
Average 11.6% 5.62
Fig. 7. Libraries found in apps removed from Google Play.
will be able to determine the shifting nature of ad libraries, as
well as Google’s response to the challenges posed by them.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Much remains to be done in tracking the development of
the Android ad ecosystem. Ongoing sampling of Google Play
would allow the construction of a dataset of apps providing
greater detail for diachronic studies. Similar sampling of third
party app stores would provide an additional longitudinal
dataset of significant value.
Additionally, more precise measurement of the available
data may yield interesting insights. Static analysis could reveal
the conditions under which the various API calls are made, and
help to determine if they are explicitly triggered by the user, an
important measurement for privacy questions. It is conceivable
that, while apps are capable of making more sensitive API
calls, they are also making them in a more responsible fashion.
Furthermore, a more thorough understanding of the informa-
tion exchanged between the app and its libraries, and between
the libraries and the ad servers are also needed. We will seek
to address many of these issues in our ongoing research.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Android environment was carefully designed to provide
security by separating applications from each other and lim-
iting their permissions. It also provides strong infrastructure
for patching and updating applications, either in response
to security flaws or to fix bugs and provide new features.
However, the development of ad libraries exposes a significant
weakness in that design. Because an ad library is bundled
within an application, it operates with the same permissions as
the application. There is also no way for the library developer
to push updates, aside from releasing a new library version
and encouraging developers to adopt it. It was this flaw that
made it possible for us to sample older library versions by
looking at apps currently released for download.
Our research showed that ad libraries are increasingly taking
advantage of permissions that may be requested by the host
application. With the exception of location data, we observed a
steady increase in the number of permissions ad libraries were
capable of utilizing. Particularly disturbing is the growth in the
usage of various dangerous permissions that pose particular
privacy risks. While these permissions are used by only a
small number of ad libraries, their use is steadily growing,
and should be considered with particular scrutiny. Given the
increasing intrusiveness of advertising libraries on the Android
platform, the importance of community norms to protect user
privacy becomes ever clearer. Without an effective response
from Google, via its Play Store, the only viable alternative to
protect users’ privacy would seem to be government regula-
tion.
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IX. APPENDIX 1
The following chart summarizes the raw data collected for
this research. The first column gives the name of the ad agency,
the second column gives the number of apps in which any
version of that agency’s libraries were found. The third column
gives a lower bound for the number of times that the libraries
are installed. The fourth column gives the total number of
permissions used in at least 2% of the libraries from that
agency. The package name is the package name by which
we identified the library in question.
†Only versions of AirPush that did not have obscured
package names were recorded, providing a lower bound on
the number of installs.
Library Name Number of Apps Install Count Number of Permissions Package Name
1 AdMob (com.google) 44,107 6,711,025,298 5 com.google.ads
2 Flurry 9,411 3,150,987,621 5 com.flurry
3 InMobi 3,933 1,713,911,340 7 com.inmobi
4 TapJoy 2,456 1,250,599,000 5 com.tapjoy
5 MobClix 3,782 963,004,760 15 com.mobclix
6 ChartBoost 1,935 772,087,100 4 com.chartboost
7 AdWhirl 3,913 712,401,775 4 com.adwhirl
8 MoPub 1,283 703,792,000 5 com.mopub
9 GreyStripe 816 633,353,550 4 com.greystripe
10 JumpTap 1,054 530,924,930 6 com.jumptap
11 Google Analytics 1,258 530,527,776 2 com.google.analytics
12 AdMob (com.admob) 6,931 507,426,872 5 com.admob
13 Burstly 105 433,160,050 7 com.burstly
14 SponsorPay 454 393,370,000 3 com.sponsorpay
15 Cauly 1,504 367,011,400 7 com.cauly
16 MobFox 1,931 356,714,780 6 com.mobfox
17 Vpon.com 687 315,392,200 6 com.vpon
18 AppBrain 2,081 311,924,110 2 com.appbrain
19 Daum.net 1,888 310,528,010 11 net.daum
20 AdMarvel 611 244,899,550 6 com.admarvel
21 AppLovin 987 244,547,600 9 com.applovin
22 Adfonic 767 225,023,320 5 com.adfonic
23 MdotM 637 218,410,710 5 com.mdotm
24 GetJar 255 191,135,000 6 com.getjar
25 NexAge 301 179,990,000 7 com.nexage
26 InnerActive 884 176,181,360 6 com.inneractive
27 Pontiflex 520 164,456,100 6 com.pontiflex
28 ZestAdz 690 148,549,000 1 com.zestadz
29 MadHouse 438 146,908,110 9 com.madhouse
30 Smaato 816 145,135,170 6 com.smaato
31 YouMi 534 145,130,600 8 net.youmi
32 mAdvertise.de 645 134,302,100 5 de.madvertise
33 DoMob.cn 664 126,351,770 8 cn.domob
34 Jirbo/AdColony 362 125,025,000 4 com.jirbo.adcolony
35 RevMob 706 106,903,620 6 com.revmob
36 SendDroid 1,335 92,244,650 8 com.senddroid
37 AirPush† 1,966 91,891,250 9 com.airpush
38 Tapit 458 87,377,220 7 com.tapit
39 Medialets 243 81,765,050 6 com.medialets
40 Mediba 964 76,796,010 4 mediba.ad
41 Papaya 377 71,573,750 15 com.papaya
42 Hunt Mobile Ads 354 57,602,320 3 com.huntmads
43 RhythmNewMedia 194 50,345,050 6 com.rhythmnewmedia
44 TapForTap 424 38,493,210 4 com.tapfortap
45 AdKnowledge 578 34,113,760 3 com.adknowledge
46 Metaps 134 29,850,000 4 net.metaps
47 WiYun 361 21,809,100 12 com.wiyun
48 Vdopia.com 179 21,587,000 3 com.vdopia
49 Waps 192 21,271,000 8 com.waps
50 AdWo 336 14,353,600 4 com.adwo
51 MoboSquare 8 14,210,000 3 com.mobosquare
52 Vserv 161 11,722,100 6 mobi.vserv
53 WooBoo 203 10,542,100 7 com.wooboo
54 EverBadge 134 10,051,010 2 com.everbadge
55 AirAd 138 8,856,000 5 com.mt.airad
56 Noqoush/AdFalcon 102 7,361,000 5 com.noqoush.adfalcon
57 Moolah 268 6,190,000 4 com.moolah
58 Kuguo 160 5,354,010 11 com.kuguo
59 BuzzCity 22 5,180,000 2 buzzcity
60 AdsMogo 67 4,890,000 8 com.adsmogo
61 SellaRing 94 3,331,000 7 com.sellaring
62 StartApp 22 1,535,000 3 com.startapp
63 AdModa 11 1,450,000 1 com.admoda
64 MobPartner 5 1,040,000 2 com.mobpartner
65 QuClix 9 345,000 2 com.quclix
66 lDevelop 7 176,000 1 com.ldevelop
TOTALS 108,852 24,274,397,772
